2017
Critique and Critique 703
First, Frankenberg castigates comparative law's "Anglo-Eurocentrism" and maintains the correlative need to "provincialize Western law." 9 While one may express surprise that comparatists should stand accused of falling prey to unwarrantable ethnocentrism, to a vestrydom going beyond that with which one is arguably inevitably burdened, it bears recalling Jacques Derrida's warning to the effect that " [o] ne [is] apparently avoiding ethnocentrism at the very point when it will have already operated in depth, silently imposing its ongoing concepts of speech and writing." 10 Secondly, the author chastises law's comparatists for hiding "the relations between knowledge and power." 11 In particular, Frankenberg attacks what he styles comparative law's "posture of innocence" and its obsession with "cognitive control."
12 Frankenberg thus decries comparatists for "comfortably accept[ing] the traditional object-subject conception of comparison," 13 for pursuing "what they believ[e] to be an 'objective' access to the reality of foreign law," 14 for being "bent on determining what the law is in another country, the law as contained in statutes and court decisions and accompanied by scholarly commentary,"
15 therefore excluding "all extralegal incursions -notably politics, ethics, culture and the economy -on law-making and law-deciding." 16 Frankenberg rejects this " [b] oundary-work" and the ensuing "reduc[tion] [of comparative law] to a mere technicality,"
17 not unlike engineering, 18 holding that "a discipline defined by its techniques is almost invariably complemented by tales of its scientific nature" 19 -as is indeed the case with comparative law, long marked by the "ambition to promote [itself] to a science." 20 Moreover, Frankenberg contradicts the comparatists' "similarity disposition"
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and objects to "the moral deficit that comes with the routine management of similarities." 21 In this regard, he percipiently notes, directing his attention to comparative law's typical "unitary projects,"
22 that "the universal does not exist independently from the particular perspective from which it is seen." 23 In sum, the author attacks comparative law's "logocentric, positivist […] course," 24 its understanding of "the legal vocabulary and grammar as an autonomous body of rules and decisions, arguments and doctrines," 25 as a "narrow cognitive operation" marred by an "astonishing aloofness from methodological and epistemological battles." 26 Thirdly, Frankenberg, adamantly set to move beyond comparative law's "unbearable formalism, barrenness and mechanistic style," 27 attends to "the ethical and political implications of locating, studying and comparing the foreign."
28 He thus propounds a strategy "for recognizing the other -foreign legal systems, cultures, institutions -in its own right," 29 which he articulates around "the twin operations of distancing and differencing,"
30 each motion an occurrence of performativity, 31 of constructivism also. 32 For Frankenberg, "distancing/differencing calls on the comparatist to decenter her worldview and to consciously establish subjectivity and context in the comparative space, that is, to take into account the observer's perspective." 33 In other terms, "comparatists operate and observe within the boundaries of a particular context and interpret what they see within a particular matrix provided by a specific cultural context that constitutes law and is also constituted by law." 34 According to Frankenberg, " [b] oth operations encompass the 21 Id. at ix, 88. 22 Id. at 44. 23 Id. at 98. 24 Id. p. 14. 25 Id. p. 5. 26 Id. at 37, 78. 27 Id. at 288. 28 Id. at 41. 29 Id. at 6. 30 Id. at 42 (emphasis original). 31 See id. at ix, 111. 32 See id. at ix, x. 33 Id. at 74 (emphasis original). 34 Id. at 72 (emphasis original).
Critique and Critique 705
willingness and capability to cope with preconceptions and stereotypes, biases and rationalist assumptions that fall within the analytical framework and normative matrix of one's own (legal) education and experience."
35
As he proceeds to enunciate his theoretical engagement, Frankenberg entwines his claims with a historical panorama of the discourses having successively dominated the field's epistemic scene over the years. Specifically, the author identifies four principal (and overlapping) phases, which he styles "universalism" 36 -the 1900 Paris conference, the quest for a droit commun législatif, and the configuration of law as a science universelle, both uniformizing pursuits driven by "a rhetoric of truth and objectivity"; 37 "taxonomy" -the age of legal systems (or families);
38 "functionalism" 39 -"the categorical imperative of comparative reason,"
40 effectively "an analytical device introduced […] [for] the narrow purpose of comparative legal problem-solving," 41 but a practice "not likely to either recognize or respect, let alone relish, significant differences" across laws;
42 and "factualism"
43 -the self-indulgent, rambling, untheorized, and insignificant "common core" initiative hailing from Trento and having developed under two tutelary deities, Rodolfo Sacco and Rudolf Schlesinger, the former committed to "structuralist positivism," the latter to comparison "in terms of precise and narrow rules" that would "carry the same meaning to lawyers brought up in various legal systems." 45 Bringing together what he identifies as the four current epistemic strands within comparative law, 46 contributing his own distancing/differencing rejoinder, Frankenberg produces a master grid where the 35 Id. at 83. 36 See id. at 42-47. 37 Id. at 45. 38 See id. at 47-52. 39 See id. at 52-59. 40 Id. at 52. 41 Id. at 54-55. 42 Id., at 57. 43 See id. at 59-70, 94-95. 44 Id. at 63. 45 Although many approach the issue of religious attire by readily mobilizing an ethnocentric, controlling, assimilationist, imperialist, crusading, proselytizing, or universalizing frame of mind -not unlike comparative law's "similarizers" -others, like Frankenberg, defy a "reductionist understanding of […] practices of dress."
53
Channelling a distancing/differencing standpoint, Frankenberg withstands "the denial of Muslim women and their complex identity construction." 54 As he stigmatizes "the colonial obsession with unveiling, uncovering and unmasking," 55 the refusal to respect the fact that "the covered 47 See id. at 84. 48 See id. at 117-64. 49 Id. at 118. 50 Id. at 130. 51 Id. at 150, 142. 52 Id. at 138. 53 Id. at 143-44. 54 Id. at 143. 55 Id. at 148.
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Critique The chapters on human rights and access to justice -the latter an institutional framework on which "the very effectiveness of human rights law hinges" 63 -offer instances of Frankenberg's ambition, as befits a comparatist, "to unsettle the political routines of […] policies and put into perspective the moral high ground of normativist projects."
64 With respect to human rights, Frankenberg invites his readership to "re-imagin[e] [human rights law] as a point of departure for the resistance to normalization and ideology."
65 Indeed, the romantic ubiquity of human-rights discourse means that one is liable to forget how it features "mechanisms that re-present, re-construct and transform reality in a specific way. 708 G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l Vol. 18 No. 03
[a] humanist ethics," 67 they engender alienation, namely the "relegat[ion] of rights-holders to the role of intimidated and rather ignorant bystanders who observe the automatic functioning of a well-oiled, complex legal machinery."
68 Further limitations coincident with the normalization of human rights include justification (to account for organized state violence), selectivity (or the preferencing of certain rights), routinization (or institutional ritualization), and de-politicization. 69 Frankenberg's theme is analogous as regards access to justice: "While modernist, romantic narratives stress the empowering and liberating effects law and access to courts may have, one has to add that law-rule comes at a cost."
70 And the price is that "[c]onflicts [have to be] shifted from the everyday location where they arise -home, street, school, workplace -and transferred to official institutions and handed over to professional bodies specialized in dealing with legal conflicts." 71 In other words, "everyday conflicts are forced into the format of a case."
72 But this displacement entails that "the political-social dimension of a conflict, the personal drama also ten[d] to get lost or obscured in translation."
73 Frankenberg emphasizes how this inevitably simplificatory process of normalization breeds disempowerment and alienation, 74 therefore questioning the very "justice" that one is meant to be accessing.
Drawing on contemporary ethnography, Frankenberg's bracing conclusive remarks enter a plea for "thick" comparison, for narrativized comparative work that is "open to local knowledge and context sensitive,"
75 "interested in restoring and rehabilitating law's detail," 76 keen to "transmit the richness of law's events […] with their cultural background as well as their political, economic and social ramifications." 77 And the "thickness" that 67 Id. at 179. 68 Id. at 180. 69 See id. at 171-86. 70 Id. at 218. 71 Id.
72 Id. at 219. 73 Id. 74 See id. at 220-22. 75 Id. at 227. 76 Id. at 228. 77 Id.
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Frankenberg advocates supposes an acute awareness that "the comparatist is always already anchored in a specific, particular legal tradition, culture and experience." 78 *** Eruditely invigorating, Frankenberg's critical aspirations are nonetheless incompletely radical, his oppositional edge insufficiently sharp, to operate as comparative law's governing epistemic practice. Frankenberg's critical reticence is apparent in at least five respects.
There is no meaningful foreign law other than as culture. Without wanting to reduce complex works of scholarship to their abstracts or titles, publishers' law lists and journals' tables of contents obstinately offer a plethora of evidence that comparative law's orthodoxy remains in thrall to a Kelsenian mindset whereby "[t]he law counts only as positive law." 79 Now, positivists are primarily preoccupied with analytics, that is, with legal technique and with the rationalization of legal technique. They foster "legal dogmatics," to transpose the well-rehearsed German phrase, in as much as they purport to arrange the law in orderly, coherent, and systematic fashion. Throughout, their investigations remain squarely set on rules -on what has been posited by authorized officials as "what the law is" -and on the formulation of rehearsals of these rules, whether judicial or academic, that are readily offered as veritistic. In Frederick Schauer's terms, "the description of law" stands "at the heart of the positivist outlook."
80 Indeed, this understanding of the legal appears so uncontroversial within mainstream comparative law that one finds oneself encountering a cavalier dismissal to the effect that any re-consideration of the matter would prove "largely sterile and boring."
81 Such unhelpful presumption notwithstanding, a marginal view has emerged to claim that foreign law ought to be studied in context. In other words, an examination of the 2004 French statute on religious attire at school (to track one of Frankenberg's leading illustrations) should favour a contextual analysis so as to embrace, say, historical, social, political, and ideological -that is, culturalconsiderations pertaining to the legislative text. But this argument must be deemed unacceptable. As it confines culture to the periphery of the legal, it leaves unchallenged the dominant view of law-as-law, of law as consisting of the legal only -of the legal understood as unsullied or uncontaminated by other discourses. To relegate culture to the circumference of the law means, in effect, that comparative law's orthodoxy can easily 78 
Id. at 230 (emphasis original
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G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l Vol. 18 No. 03 continue to dismiss it as being irrelevant. In order to counter this positivism which, even on a most generous reading of what it is able to achieve, can only ever allow one to identify the foreign law in force rather than explain it in depth, comparatists, who require to ascribe meaning to another law, to address the question "why?," resolutely need to argue that "law is thoroughly a cultural construct," 82 that "law is culture-specific." 83 Only if they undertake such a re-signification of the legal can comparatists begin to produce meaningful reports concerning foreign law.
It is not, then, that an examination of the French statute on religious attire at school should feature social or ideological considerations which would be situated beyond the law, but that it should include these as law. Indeed, when reckoning the ideology that informs the French statute, for example, one has not left the law. Rather, one is dismantling the text of the law to peruse what it has been concealing. In effect, one is reading between the lines -which means that one is still reading the law-text itself. If you will, it is as if the French statute was being subjected to a spectroscope which would photograph the ideological phantoms constitutively haunting it. If, as Frankenberg convincingly suggests, the French statute is Islamophobic (that is, if it inscribes a fear of Islam), such Islamophobia forms an inherent part of the statute's textual fabric and semantic reach so that the legislative text can legitimately be said to exist as an Islamophobic statement. In the process, lawindeed, legislated law, the very hallmark of positivism -is seen to feature an ideological mark or trace which lives on as the statute and which a close reading relying on a sound knowledge of French culture can meaningfully disclose. This affirmation is well worth emphasizing: Islamophobia is not to be regarded as contextual vis-à-vis the law or as external to it or as some sort of parergon belonging to the realm of non-law. Islamophobia concerns the very texture of the law-text: it informs the making or fabrication of the text; it lurks within the law-text as the law-text now exists, it remains as a textual survivancy. To trace the French statute on religious attire at school to the Islamophobic threads that constitute it is therefore not to leave the law for the land of the extra-legal. Rather, it is to probe the law -to excavate it 84 -to disassemble the legal that was once assembled in the form of a statute, a complex and multi-dimensional construct, with a view to eliciting -to bringing to light -the law-text's discursive "building blocks" and to making sense of this singular textual composition.
Although much could aptly be written about culture, suffice it to acknowledge the noticeable fact that any cultural analysis calls to be approached in terms of an infinite process of quarrying. No anamnesis can therefore account interpretively for the full extent of law's cultural markers. It follows that there are never exhaustive comparisons, only 82 BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, REALISTIC SOCIO-LEGAL THEORY 128 (1997). 83 George P. Fletcher, What Law Is Like, 50 SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 1599, 1610 (1997). 84 Derrida mentions "le travail en creux de l'interrogation." JACQUES DERRIDA, L'ECRITURE ET LA DIFFÉRENCE 49 (1967).
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Critique and Critique 711 exhausted comparatists (ascription of meaning to law-as-culture thus falling prey to the body and being ultimately interrupted by it).
There is no meaningful foreign law other than as unforeign law. When a German comparatist enters a Paris library to ascribe meaning to the French statute on religious attire at school so as to articulate a (forced) negotiation between French and German laws, the French law-text stands before her, twice: it is in front of her, on the statute book, as she sits at her desk, and it has come into legal being in advance of her arrival. Still, the statute cannot mean on its own. As the legislative text uses terms like "tenues" ("attire"/"garb"/"apparel"), "manifestent" ("attest to"/"express") or "ostensiblement" ("conspicuously"), the semantic extension of these words is not fixated in self-evidence. Any foreign law-text therefore demands an interpreter in order to accede to signification.
The meaning that the German comparatist assigns to the French statute should be based on a sound appreciation of French culture, French legal culture, and French law. Moreover, it should rest on thorough and thoroughly interdisciplinary research. Crucially, however, the German comparatist we assume dwells in the German culture or language to which she belongs, operates under the influence of the German legal education that institutionalized her into the law, and works pursuant to the influence of her dissertation supervisor, a leading comparatist from Berlin who socialized her into comparative law (himself the pupil of a famed Heidelberg comparatist). (Note that for the German comparatist's heteronomous engagement with the French statute to be possible at all, it is necessary that her thought should be embedded within such pre-understanding. Otherwise, how could she even begin to recognize the French statute as legislation rather than as a poem?) In addition, the reading of the French statute that the German comparatist produces foregrounds her substantive and stylistic emphases, choice of references, selection of quotations, formulation of headings, adoption of certain words or expressions, and assumption of a precise tone. The statute thus assumes the interpretive appearance that the comparatist fashions for it: as reader of the statute, on the basis of "her" reading of the text, the interpreter becomes its author.
Even as the French statute exists independently of the German comparatist, it cannot exist meaningfully without her or without alternate interpreters. Strictly speaking, the law-text cannot exist meaningfully, but as interpreted words. In other terms, "the meaning of a text is not to be found in it like a stone and hel[d] up for display." 85 Without the decisive intervention of an interpreter and an interpreter's language, the statute is destined to remain meaningless. For the meaningfulness of the statute to emerge, interpretation -in effect, speculation -must act constitutively; it must enable or emancipate the text into meaning. As regards the French statute on religious attire at school, the German comparatist will thus proceed to interpret or speculate until she feels confident that she 712 G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l Vol. 18 No. 03
has framed a textual interpretation of the law-text amenable to adhesion (any reception of her proposed reading being subordinated not to some algorithm, but to an extraordinarily intricate interlapping of complex regimes of disclosure and appreciation).
86
Since, within a comparative dynamics, the French statute on religious attire at school only exists meaningfully as German -or as Italian or Canadian -commentary, it follows that the French statute's meaningful existence is, say, as the German comparatist's German analysis in the German language. This epistemic fact implies that when the German comparatist writes on the French statute, she is addressing foreign law in a limited sense of the word "foreign" only. The so-called "foreign" finds itself being always already deFrenchified/Germanized, the Verfremdungseffekt instantaneously compromised. On close examination, the German comparatist's account of French law is therefore not a report relating to foreign law. Rather, it configures a disrelation as it conveys French-lawthrough-German-eyes-and-words instead of anything that would be French law as sucheven supposing such "as-suchness" to be fathomable. Again, the only French law that our hypothetical comparatist can have in mind is a French law that is present to her as always already Germanized French law, as unforeign law. It is in this sense also that foreign law cannot exist meaningfully except as the comparatist's constitutive interpretation or speculation. No matter how rigorous one's economy of application, the journey to cannot be achieved, the journey from cannot be escaped. While the comparatist may be after the foreign, earnestly, the comparative incursion stands in effect as an exercise in introspection. Implacably, "it is always [one] There is no foreign law-text other than as playground. (Encultured and unforeign) lawtexts are necessarily fashioned out of language whose intrinsic ductility generates an uncircumventable semantic lee-way or play -as in "room for action," "scope for activity" (Oxford English Dictionary) -which pertains to the very texture of textuality. In other words, textuality's basal condition is as semantic heterogeneity, which means that the 86 See SAMUEL BECKETT, THE UNNAMABLE 85 (Steven Connor ed., 2010) ("What can one do but speculate, speculate, until one hits on the happy speculation?"). since it must follow that "meaning depends on play," 90 no original, fixed, or ultimate meaning can be extracted from a text. Rather, the making of textuality is such that every text structurally holds the possibility of disseminating an infinity of meanings. This is an irrepressible fact pertaining to textual architectonics which every interpreter must confront. Even as the interpreter projects himself towards the text with a view to making sense of it, to assigning salience to aspects of it, the text, in some sort of counteracting drive, has always already undertaken to dominate the interpreter's doing. In particular, the text unceasingly plays through the interpreter no matter how determined she is to arrest its motion.
While the interpreter purports to achieve the unconcealment of the text, the playing text withdraws from any attempt to stabilize it across any self/other line. Addressing this resistance to disclosure, Heidegger refers to "the primal conflict between clearing and concealing." 91 Instead of a consensus between interpretandum and interpretans, there is insurmountable strife. And it is because of such discord that Heidegger rejects "the structure of an agreement between knowing and the object in the sense of the adjustment of one being (subject) to another (object)." 92 As the text's presencing takes the form of an obtrusion, 93 textual play operates agonistically. The inherence of play to textuality thus denies every archaeological tentative to seize the totality of the text's meaning, to capture the entire text. No matter how sophisticatedly the interpreter responds to the play of the text, this failure of isomorphism means that textuality will preserve an interpretive remainder, a "singularity forever encrypted," 94 a secret which interpretation simply cannot peer.
Nothwithstanding the unreflective assumption on the part of law's comparatists that a law-text can only comprise a set of noncontradictory properties -either the French statute on religious attire at school is Islamophobic or it is not -the structure of textuality commands that no text can answer to one and only one admissible interpretation, awkward as this insight may prove from the standpoint of law's normativity. The circumstance that two interpretations are contradictory does not exclude that they can both prove convincing at the same time from the vantage-place of various interpreters or 89 93 See WHITE, supra note 85, at 80 (referring to "the independent force of the text"). 
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G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l Vol. 18 No. 03 of different interpretive constituencies for whom the play of the text generates specific (and incompatible) interpretive outcomes. Although incongruent interpretations -one that imputes Islamophobia to French legislation, the other that makes the case for the religious disinterestedness of the statute -cannot both be true, the notion of truth is irrelevant to the pertinence of interpretive assertions since the play of the text entails that it cannot mean as an interpretation-independent entity. While the French statute itself cannot adjudicate between the multiplicity of interpretive or speculative accounts that are applicable to it, the play of the text ensures that every interpretation, necessarily mediated and implicitly denying other possible re-presentations, intervenes as an ever-defeasible narrative proposal which, in the absence of any unbiased readerly criterion, is destined to be validated or disconfirmed on the basis of its (perceived) persuasive merit or demerit rather than because of any intrinsic idea of rightness or exactness. Note that it is not that there is more than one legislative text, and that it is not either that the statute was drafted ambiguously. Rather, it is that the text is, densely, textual.
There is no translation of foreign law other than as impossibility. Foreign law-texts typically demand translation. Consider our German comparatist actively writing/producing her account of the French statute on religious attire at school and transposing the expression "les écoles, les collèges et les lycées publics" as "öffentliche Grundschulen, Mittelschulen und Gymnasien." While seemingly agreeable, this German translation in fact raises insurmountable problems. Ultimately, it reveals how each langage unfolds monologically. 95 
